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The principal-agent problem

The principal-agent problem arises as a result of the need for the owners, or ‘principals’, of large firms to delegate decision making to others – the managers, or ‘agents’.

As firms grow there is often a separation of ownership and control, which opens up the possibility of a conflict of interest between different parties. In other words, the agents may not act in the best interest of the principals.

The principal-agent problem is commonly regarded as a consequence of asymmetric knowledge with the agent knowing more than the principal and exploiting their superior knowledge. Superior knowledge may arise as a result of particular expertise (such an accounting or marketing expertise), or simply because they are more closely involved in the decision-making process than the principals (including the shareholders).

Inefficiency

The principal-agent problem creates inefficiency in that it adds extra costs to the business in two basic ways. Firstly, the additional costs of monitoring the activities of agents, and secondly the additional incentives that may have to be given to agents to get them to perform their duties efficiently.

As a simple example, imagine you own and run a small store – you make all the decisions and are accountable to yourself. You draw a wage, and also receive a dividend each year if the business makes a profit. You have a minor accident, which, with treatment and convalescent, keeps you off work for 3 months. As a temporary fix you employ an individual who has been recommended to you by a neighbour to run the store for you. After two weeks your takings are down. Several issues are now raised – especially regarding trust.

As a response you hire a company to install a camera and, given you feel that the temporary store manager is not motivated, so you offer an incentive based on sales. These are now extra costs that did not exist before.

When firms grow, similar issues arise regarding the relationship between shareholders and the managers they appoint, and the increased costs associated with trying to solve the principal-agent problem.